explore-blog:


“A writer who waits for ideal conditions under which to work will die without putting a word on paper.”

E. B. White, echoing Tchaikovsky and adding to our running archive of famous advice on writing.

explore-blog:

“A writer who waits for ideal conditions under which to work will die without putting a word on paper.”

E. B. White, echoing Tchaikovsky and adding to our running archive of famous advice on writing.

(Source: explore-blog, via npr)

crisisgroup:

Mali: No Quick Fixes for a Complex Crisis | allAfrica
By Gilles Yabi
The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) has agreed on a revised concept of operations for the deployment of an international military force of 3,300 soldiers to help the Malian state wrest control of the northern part of the country from Islamist fighters.
This step, taken on November 11 following a collective effort by regional and international partners, is welcome. But military intervention alone cannot solve the country’s deep crisis.
The situation in Mali is desperately fractious. A military coup toppled the government in March, while separatists and al-Qaeda-linked fundamentalists took over the northern half of the country. Mali is now divided geographically, politically, militarily and religiously.
FULL ARTICLE (allAfrica)
Photo: Magharebia/Flickr  

crisisgroup:

Mali: No Quick Fixes for a Complex Crisis | allAfrica

By Gilles Yabi

The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) has agreed on a revised concept of operations for the deployment of an international military force of 3,300 soldiers to help the Malian state wrest control of the northern part of the country from Islamist fighters.

This step, taken on November 11 following a collective effort by regional and international partners, is welcome. But military intervention alone cannot solve the country’s deep crisis.

The situation in Mali is desperately fractious. A military coup toppled the government in March, while separatists and al-Qaeda-linked fundamentalists took over the northern half of the country. Mali is now divided geographically, politically, militarily and religiously.

FULL ARTICLE (allAfrica)

Photo: Magharebia/Flickr  

149 Years Ago, The Humblest of Words so Resonate

The Gettysburg Address

Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.

Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battlefield of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate—we cannot consecrate—we cannot hallow—this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom— and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.

aheram:


2,003 Deaths in Afghanistan

The chart shows deaths of identified United States service members directly involved in the war in Afghanistan. Rocket-propelled grenades and small-arms fire took the largest number of American lives earlier in the war. In 2008, deaths from improvised explosive devices, or I.E.D.’s, began to make up a larger share of combat deaths.

In a related post, both the Obama and Romney campaign are loathe to talk about it.

aheram:

2,003 Deaths in Afghanistan

The chart shows deaths of identified United States service members directly involved in the war in Afghanistan. Rocket-propelled grenades and small-arms fire took the largest number of American lives earlier in the war. In 2008, deaths from improvised explosive devices, or I.E.D.’s, began to make up a larger share of combat deaths.

In a related post, both the Obama and Romney campaign are loathe to talk about it.

(via againstpower)

crisisgroup:

Syria crisis: rebels ‘execute shabiha’ in Aleppo - Wednesday 1 August 2012  |  The Guardian
By Matthew Weaver and Brian Whitaker
Summary of the latest developments on Syria
• The Assad regime is morphing into a brutal militia that is pushing the conflict towards an even bloodier outcome than many feared, according to a new report by the International Crisis Group.
• In a telephone interview with the Guardian, a spokesman for the Tawheed (“Unification”) Brigade in Aleppo has described “field trials” of shabiha suspects. He said those believed to have been involved in killing were executed, while others are being kept for trial “after the collapse of the regime”.
• After some delay, the opposition Syrian National Council has now condemned the executions carried out by rebels in Aleppo.
The Guardian
Photo: Freedom House/Flickr

crisisgroup:

Syria crisis: rebels ‘execute shabiha’ in Aleppo - Wednesday 1 August 2012  |  The Guardian

By Matthew Weaver and Brian Whitaker

Summary of the latest developments on Syria

• The Assad regime is morphing into a brutal militia that is pushing the conflict towards an even bloodier outcome than many feared, according to a new report by the International Crisis Group.

• In a telephone interview with the Guardian, a spokesman for the Tawheed (“Unification”) Brigade in Aleppo has described “field trials” of shabiha suspects. He said those believed to have been involved in killing were executed, while others are being kept for trial “after the collapse of the regime”.

• After some delay, the opposition Syrian National Council has now condemned the executions carried out by rebels in Aleppo.

The Guardian

Photo: Freedom House/Flickr

The Uneasiness of Intervention

I must give Anne-Marie Slaughter credit, she is unwavering in her support for international intervention wherever the opportunity to do so arises throughout the greater North African/Middle East area but just as her opinion article suggests that some of the risks to the U.S. from its current policy toward Syria are laughable, she seems to place a lot of stock into the assertion that Syrian memories are long.

The article states, “When we control Syria, we won’t forget that you forgot about us” attributing that to the sister of a dead Free Syrian Army soldier, the Princeton Professor using the quote to suggest that it is representative of the metaphorical threat that the U.S. and Europe will face after the rebel factions seize control of the country as if that outcome is already a foregone conclusion.

It is interesting that the risks she lists are seemingly laughed off while less plausible and historically unproven outcomes are deemed almost inevitable. Slaughter sounds the alarms about internal sectarian violence further destabilizing the greater Middle Eastern region without intervention which has not yet been realized in any recent uprising yet she very nearly discounts the obvious threats of arming the opposition and the long term consequences of short term desires.

The “Arab Spring” has spread throughout the region not by violence or instability spilling over borders, but by individual groups taking the initiative they see being taken in other countries by people in similar situations. Ironically, the only recent case of violent spillover comes by way of Mali, where the flow of unchecked western arms from intervention in Libya are alleged to have helped embolden the Islamist rebels in the north known now as Azawad into launching an offensive that saw them capture large swathes of the country.

Anne-Marie Slaughter promulgates the much bandied threats of this spillover of war into Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and even Jordan. Played even is the dreaded “chemical weapons” card to force the hands of those perceived by her as missing the chance to be on the right side of history.

Do we so soon forget about the lessons of Iraq? The lessons learned only through the deaths of thousands and the unaccounted for expenditure of hundreds of billions for no discernible gain and no discernible benefit? Admittedly, the situations are not equivalent but many of the reasons for action are. Do we so readily ignore the similar threats of violent spillover, chemical weapons, and regional instability as a world threat that never materialized made in 2002 and 2003 to justify invasion into Iraq? Do we so easy fear the empty threats of rag tag, fractious rebel groups, scorned by the ravages of a war started without the means or long term planning to ensure victory?

The assertion that intervention in Syria would be a bold and smart move by President Obama is unsettling. That this type of assertion emanates from such an intelligent, informed, and engaged person of considerable influence is downright disheartening. We have seen the long term consequences of short term policies. We have been mired in a decade of war in Afghanistan because of a failure to plan for the long term. We spent nearly that long in Iraq, bleeding lives, bleeding reserves, and bleeding economies because of a failure to create long term plans.

As long as the U.S. continues to ignore outcomes and consequences, refuses to learn the lessons of recent history, and fails to properly plan for the operations which it undertakes, we should not be surprised when things do not turn out as expected or these political adventures fail to produce any tangible benefit or reward bettering the resources or efforts required.

What is a threat to the U.S. and its interests is not an Assad run Syria it is an unstable Syria poorly run by disparate groups with misaligned goals, misaligned beliefs, and misaligned priorities. Freedom and democracy are attainable by those ready to fight for it, but only sustainable by those ready to unite for it.

The various interests that comprise what we so neatly refer to as the Syrian opposition have but one goal in common, the ouster of Bashar al-Assad. That is a lofty goal and one that Assad and his forces will clearly do anything to prevent but what no one can articulate is what happens the day after? What happens when the sole focus of war and hatred is removed from power or like his counterpart in Libya, removed from power after being brutally sodomized with rebar and summarily executed on a dusty street in Damascus without charge or trial?

What then?

Will the rebel groups lay down their advanced, western heavy weapons, join hands, and proclaim to a generous U.S., “thanks for the memories” as they meticulously catalog, account for, and hand back caches of MANPADs donated by the well-meaning U.S. government?

Is the relative security of the U.S. any more or less stable for failing to intervene in Egypt when similar calls were made to do so or by deciding to get involved in Libya when equivalent threats of spreading regional instability were made?  Can anyone produce metrics of increased stability as a direct result of U.S. involvement?

Let us not pretend that human lives factor in to any decisions that nations make on behalf of interests for if the world’s nations truly cared about humanity, we would take steps to alleviate the conditions and suffering that results in the starvation deaths of 15 people every minute around the world.

Syria faces a crisis, an internal crisis, that while seething, shows few signs of truly traversing its borders into neighboring regions just as the situation in Iraq, as exponentially worse as it was, did not infect or ignite destabilizing violence in its neighboring nations, even those shared with Syria.

U.S. involvement in Syria has few benefits, many, many costs, and may only serve to further destabilize a precarious situation. We must carefully weigh out the possible outcomes, good and bad, with a view to the long term ramifications of each to see if the price of an ousted Assad is worth the cost of U.S. provided heavy weapons possibly permeating throughout the region or the world for once those cats are let out of the bag, they cannot be returned.

theatlantic:

In Focus: Remembering Tiananmen Square 

Top: A Chinese man stands alone to block a line of tanks heading east on Beijing’s Cangan Boulevard in Tiananmen Square, on on June 5, 1989. The man, calling for an end to violence and bloodshed against pro-democracy demonstrators, was pulled away by bystanders, and the tanks continued on their way.

Center-left: Workmen try to drape the portrait of Mao Tse-tung in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square after it was pelted with paint, on May 23, 1989.

Center-right: Bodies of dead civilians lie among crushed bicycles near Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, on June 4, 1989.

Bottom: Three unidentified men flee as a Chinese man, background left, stands alone to block a line of approaching tanks, in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, on June 5, 1989. The man in the background stood his ground and blocked the column of tanks when they came closer, an image captured on film by numerous other photographers and one that ultimately became a widely reproduced symbol of events there.

See more. [Images: AP, Reuters]

23 years ago today, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army violently cleared Beijing’s Tiananmen Square of protesters, ending a six-week demonstration that had called for democracy and widespread political reform. The protests began in April of 1989, gaining support as initial government reactions included concessions. Martial law was declared on May 20, troops were mobilized, and from the night of June 3 through the early morning of June 4, the PLA pushed into Tiananmen Square, crushing some protesters and firing on many others.

The exact number killed may never be known, but estimates range from several hundred to several thousand. Today, China’s censors are blocking Internet access to the terms “six four,” “23,” “candle,” and “never forget,” broadening extensive efforts to silence talk about the 23rd anniversary of China’s bloody June 4 crackdown. Here is that story, in images and words. Please share it widely.

lisbonworldnews:

Somalia’s Complex Clan Dynamics
Seth Kaplan | January 10, 2012
Understanding the failure of Somalia as a state requires understanding the country’s complex clan dynamics.
Somalia embodies one of postcolonial Africa’s worst mismatches between conventional state structures and indigenous customs and institutions. The fact that Somalis share a common ethnicity, culture, language, and religion might seem to be an excellent basis for a cohesive polity, but in reality the Somali people are divided by clan affiliations, the most important component of their identity. Repeated attempts to impose a centralized bureaucratic governing structure have managed only to sever the state from the society that should have been its foundation, yielding the world’s most famous failed state.
The Somali population—some 13 to 14 million people, including Somalis living in neighboring states—is divided into four major clans and a number of minority groups (see map below). Each of these major clans consists of subclans and extended family networks that join or split in a fluid process of “constant decomposition and recomposition.” Like tribal societies elsewhere in the Greater Middle East, the clans use deeply ingrained customary law to govern their communities completely independently of modern state structures. Although somewhat weakened in the south from decades of urbanization, violence, and attempts to create a centralized state, these traditional groupings still hold immense influence over society.
Since the failure of the state some twenty years ago, the parts of the country that have achieved the most stability are those that are based on these clans. The Haarti grouping (a subset of the Daarood) created a semiautonomous region in the east called Puntland, while in the northeast the Isaaq clan led the effort to build Somaliland. Many other parts of Somalia have been similarly governed by local groupings, which have used the traditional governing system to resolve disputes and encourage some investment even in the absence of a formal state.
Among these regional entities, Somaliland has been the most successful, declaring itself independent and holding a series of free elections. Despite—or, perhaps, because of—a dearth of assistance from the international community, it has been able to construct a set of robust governing bodies rooted in traditional Somali concepts of governance by consultation and consent. By integrating traditional ways of governance—including customary norms, values, and relationships—within a modern state apparatus, Somaliland has achieved greater cohesion and legitimacy while—not coincidentally—creating greater room for competitive elections and public criticism than exists in most similarly endowed territories.
These dynamics suggest that any eventual solution to the problem of state building in Somalia will have to take fully into account the country’s indigenous social fabric and institutions, and will have to build from the bottom up, integrating communal ways of working together into state structures. The international community will have to abandon its attempts to impose a top-down, centralized, and profoundly artificial state model and begin to work with, rather than against, the grain of Somali society. A central government could be retained, but its functions should be strictly limited in scope and its institutions in number.
HERE

lisbonworldnews:

Somalia’s Complex Clan Dynamics

Seth Kaplan | January 10, 2012

Understanding the failure of Somalia as a state requires understanding the country’s complex clan dynamics.

Somalia embodies one of postcolonial Africa’s worst mismatches between conventional state structures and indigenous customs and institutions. The fact that Somalis share a common ethnicity, culture, language, and religion might seem to be an excellent basis for a cohesive polity, but in reality the Somali people are divided by clan affiliations, the most important component of their identity. Repeated attempts to impose a centralized bureaucratic governing structure have managed only to sever the state from the society that should have been its foundation, yielding the world’s most famous failed state.

The Somali population—some 13 to 14 million people, including Somalis living in neighboring states—is divided into four major clans and a number of minority groups (see map below). Each of these major clans consists of subclans and extended family networks that join or split in a fluid process of “constant decomposition and recomposition.” Like tribal societies elsewhere in the Greater Middle East, the clans use deeply ingrained customary law to govern their communities completely independently of modern state structures. Although somewhat weakened in the south from decades of urbanization, violence, and attempts to create a centralized state, these traditional groupings still hold immense influence over society.

Since the failure of the state some twenty years ago, the parts of the country that have achieved the most stability are those that are based on these clans. The Haarti grouping (a subset of the Daarood) created a semiautonomous region in the east called Puntland, while in the northeast the Isaaq clan led the effort to build Somaliland. Many other parts of Somalia have been similarly governed by local groupings, which have used the traditional governing system to resolve disputes and encourage some investment even in the absence of a formal state.

Among these regional entities, Somaliland has been the most successful, declaring itself independent and holding a series of free elections. Despite—or, perhaps, because of—a dearth of assistance from the international community, it has been able to construct a set of robust governing bodies rooted in traditional Somali concepts of governance by consultation and consent. By integrating traditional ways of governance—including customary norms, values, and relationships—within a modern state apparatus, Somaliland has achieved greater cohesion and legitimacy while—not coincidentally—creating greater room for competitive elections and public criticism than exists in most similarly endowed territories.

These dynamics suggest that any eventual solution to the problem of state building in Somalia will have to take fully into account the country’s indigenous social fabric and institutions, and will have to build from the bottom up, integrating communal ways of working together into state structures. The international community will have to abandon its attempts to impose a top-down, centralized, and profoundly artificial state model and begin to work with, rather than against, the grain of Somali society. A central government could be retained, but its functions should be strictly limited in scope and its institutions in number.

HERE

(Source: quintocadernografico)

cjchivers:

This post begins with a photograph of Anton Hammerl, taken a few days before he was shot and killed in Libya, in the spring of 2011.  Let’s look at it for a moment. Then let your eyes roam. Now listen to the story behind the display above.

A few days after the top photo was made, by Unai Aranzadi, Anton was shot by forces fighting for Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi on the road near Brega. The men who wounded him left him to die. They rounded up three other journalists traveling in his group and abruptly drove away, abandoning a heavily bleeding and unarmed man to the desert. The Qaddafi government lied about his fate, repeatedly telling official and diplomatic enquirers that he was alive and in custody with his peers. Only when his colleagues were released from prison, after a season of negotiation lasting more than six weeks, did the truth break free.

Anton’s death was one of the Libyan revolution’s uncountable horrors. His remains have not been found. And as is the case with almost all stories of violence, his story does not end at the scene of the crime, or neatly. It was not simply a tale of battlefield chaos, anonymous villains and the cruel and unnecessary end of a decent man.  Its effects reverberate, and will for at least a generation.

Why? Because Anton was survived by his wife, Penny Sukhraj, and their three young children, who live in London.  He was a freelancer, not a staff photographer for a newspaper, wire service or magazine. This means that his family — which has lost him as a husband, father and breadwinner — has no institutional support.  

And this is a reason for the auction, organized by Friends of Anton and to be hosted by Christiane Amanpour, that will be held next week at Christie’s in New York. Scores of prints by many of the world’s best known photographers - Robert Capa, Platon, Joao Silva, Kate Brooks, Tyler Hicks, Lynsey Addario, Sebastiao Salgado, and many more - will be offered. They are scenes from abroad, scenes from here in the states, portraits, landscapes, and much more. They come from quiet glades and vicious firefights, from the desert, the forest, the cities and the sea. Among them are works by Chris Hondros and Tim Hetherington, who were killed in Libya, also by pro-Qaddafi fighters, a few weeks after Anton died.

Don’t rely on the small sample here. Go to the Friends of Anton site and look. Some of these photos could hold your gaze for hours, and will still seem fresh should you look back in an hour, a week or a year. The proceeds from their sale will go to Penny’s children.

The last two years have been nightmarish for the cadre of journalists who worked as Anton did. Naturally, people ask: What can I do? In my own case, frankly, I do not think Suzanne and I can afford one of these prints at the auction, and I am already blessed with crowded walls, as Suzanne and friends I work beside have over the years given me prints from the shared work, which hang in the shed where I am typing this today. A black-and-white print of the portrait by Tyler, of an Afghan National Police officer in Uruzgan Province in 2007, is looking down on me from my right, from above a shelf of munitions scraps. The image by Chris Hondros, made on the road not far from where Anton was killed, in the last weeks of Chris’s life, is tucked beside my left knee underneath my work bench, waiting to be dropped off at the frame shop in town. The other frames will have to be rearranged to make space for it.

My shed, in short, is out of wall. So we decided to do something else. Late last month the Overseas Press Club, to my and most everyone else’s surprise, gave me an award, which came with a $1,000 prize. That money was unexpected, which meant it was unbudgeted; Suzanne and I had not been counting on it for raising our own children. So Suzanne and I talked. We knew well that although the prize was awarded in my name, this was in many ways an embarrassment, because I do not work alone. I work for a bank of gifted and committed editors, and with people in conflict zones who share their stories or tips with me, or help me with rides, advice, bunk space and translations. All of them make each day, and each story, come together. Throughout it all I wander the beats side-by-side with photographers, just like Anton, who share each risk and every step. It is with them that the best work has flowed. And often when I work, our family is at risk, just like Anton’s was.

And is.

For these reasons, and others, this week Suzanne and I donated the $1,000 from the Overseas Press Club to Friends of Anton. It is a small thing, barely a drop when considered against a single-parent family’s needs. But we hope it might help, and that you will help, too. If any of you can afford the time or a few of your dimes,  please consider visiting Friends of Anton on-line. Then consider attending the auction or making an absentee or telephonic bid.

Great photography outlasts those who do it. In Anton’s case, so very sadly so. Those who carry away these prints will have that work, and will have helped good people, too.

ABOUT THE PHOTOGRAPHS

The photo at top is of Anton, by Unai Aranzadi. The bottom six images, clockwise from upper left, are by Tyler Hicks, Chris Hondros, Tim Hetherington, Joao Silva, David Burnett and Robert Capa. Courtesy of Friends of Anton. (In the case of the photograph by David Burnett, Tumblr’s photo-spread feature callously auto-crops it in the display above. Click on the photograph to be treated to the full frame.)

Dear Yahya, Letters from Abbottabad

Here are links to the full documents as translated to English and provided by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

Click for zip file containing all declassified documents

This document provides a general description of the 17 declassified documents captured in the Abbottabad raid and released to the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC). For additional context please see the documents themselves and/or the CTC’s report “Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?” released in conjunction with this summary.  

The 17 documents consist of electronic letters or draft letters, totaling 175 pages in the original Arabic and 197 pages in the English translation. The earliest letter is dated September 2006 and the latest April 2011. These internal al-Qa`ida communications were authored by several  leaders, including Usama bin Ladin, `Atiyya `Abd al-Rahman, Abu Yahya al-Libi and the American Adam Gadahn, as well as several unknown individuals who were either affiliated with the group or wrote to offer it advice. Other recognizable personalities who feature in the letters either as authors, recipients or points of conversation include Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr, leader of the Somali militant group Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin; Nasir al-Wuhayshi (Abu Basir), leader of the Yemen-based al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Anwar al-`Awlaqi; and Hakimullah Mahsud, leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Some of the letters are incomplete and/or are missing their dates, and not all of the letters explicitly attribute their author(s) and/or indicate to whom they are addressed. Given that they are all electronic documents either saved on thumb drives, memory cards or the hard drive of Bin Ladin’s computer, except for the letters addressed to Bin Ladin, it cannot be ascertained whether any of these letters actually reached their intended destinations.

SOCOM-2012-0000003

This letter was authored by Usama bin Ladin and addressed to Shaykh Mahmud (`Atiyya Abdul Rahman) on 27 August 2010. Mahmud is specifically directed to tell “Basir,” who is Nasir al-Wuhayshi (Abu Basir), the leader of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula, to remain in his role (presumably in response to a request from Abu Basir that Anwar al-`Awlaqi take his position), and for him to send “us a detailed and lengthy” version of al-`Awlaqi’s resume. `Atiyya is also told to ask Basir and Anwar al-`Awlaqi for their “vision in detail about the situation” in Yemen. References are also made in the letter to the 2010 floods in Pakistan, a letter from Bin Ladin’s son Khalid to `Abd al-Latif, al-Qa`ida’s media plan for the 9/11 anniversary, and the need for the “brothers coming from Iran” to be placed in safe locations.     

SOCOM-2012-0000004  

This document is a letter authored by the American al-Qa`ida spokesman Adam Gadahn to an unknown recipient and was written in late January 2011. In the first part of the document Gadahn provides strategic advice regarding al-Qa`ida’s media plans for the tenth anniversary of 9/11. The letter is in essence a response to many of the requests/queries that Bin Ladin makes in his letter to `Atiyya dated October 2010 (SOCOM-2012-0000015), particularly those concerning a media strategy for the ten-year anniversary of 9/11. In other parts of the document Gadahn incisively criticizes the tactics and targeting calculus of the Islamic State of Iraq (AQI/ISI) and the Pakistani Taliban (TTP); he strongly advocates for  al-Qa`ida to publicly dissociate itself from both groups. The document concludes with a draft statement, which provides a candid assessment of these issues. 

SOCOM-2012-0000005

This document is a letter dated 7 August 2010 from “Zamarai” (Usama bin Ladin) to Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr, the leader of the Somali militant group Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin, which merged with al-Qa`ida after Bin Ladin’s death. The document is a response to a letter Bin Ladin received from al-Zubayr in which he requested formal unity with al-Qa`ida and either consulted Bin Ladin on the question of declaring an Islamic state in Somalia or informed him that he was about to declare one. In Bin Ladin’s response, he politely declines al-Shabab’s request for formal unity with al-Qa`ida. 

SOCOM-2012-0000006

This document is a letter believed to have been composed in December 2010 and its content relates to SOCOM-2012-0000005.  The letter is addressed to Azmarai, perhaps a typo or misspelling of the nickname Zamarai (a nickname or kunya for Bin Ladin).   While the identity of the author is unclear, the familiar tone and implicit critique of Bin Ladin’s policy vis-a-vis al-Shabab suggest that this is from a high ranking personality, possibly Ayman al-Zawahiri. Referring to “our friend’s letter” and the perspective of the “brothers…[who might have been] too concerned about inflating the size and growth of al-Qa`ida,” the author of the document urges the receiver to “reconsider your opinion not to declare the accession [i.e. formal merger] of the brothers of Somalia…” This is clearly a reference to al-Qa`ida’s potential merger with al-Shabab and suggests that al-Qa`ida’s relationship with the “affiliates” is a subject of internal debate. If indeed the author of the letter is Ayman al-Zawahiri this could be an indication of a major fissure over a key strategic question at the pinnacle of the organization (for different interpretations of this letter, see Appendix of “Letters from Abbottabad”).

SOCOM-2012-0000007

This letter is authored by Mahmud al-Hasan (`Atiyya) and Abu Yahya al-Libi and addressed to the amir of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Hakimullah Mahsud. It is dated 3 December 2010 and is sharply critical of the ideology and tactics of the TTP.  The letter makes it clear that al-Qa`ida’s senior leaders had serious concerns about the TTP’s trajectory inside Pakistan, and the impact the group’s misguided operations might have on al-Qa`ida and other militant groups in the region. The authors identify several errors committed by the group, specifically Hakimullah Mahsud’s arrogation of privileges and positions beyond what was appropriate as the TTP’s amir; the TTP’s use of indiscriminate violence and killing of Muslim civilians; and the group’s use of kidnapping. `Atiyya and al-Libi also take issue with Mahsud labeling al-Qa`ida members as “guests” and the attempts made by other groups (presumably the TTP) to siphon off al-Qa`ida members. The authors threaten that if actions are not taken to correct these mistakes, “we shall be forced to take public and firm legal steps from our side.”             

SOCOM-2012-0000008

This letter was originally an exchange between Jaysh al-Islam and `Atiyya that was forwarded first to a certain `Abd al-Hamid (and presumably to Bin Ladin later). The gist of Jaysh al-Islam’s letter makes it known that the group is in need of financial assistance “to support jihad,” and that the group is seeking `Atiyya’s legal advice on three matters: 1) the permissibility of accepting financial assistance from other militant Palestinian groups (e.g., Fatah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad); 2)  the permissibility of  investing funds in the stock market in support of jihad;  and 3)  the permissibility of striking or killing drug traffickers in order to use their money, and even drugs, to lure their enemies who could in turn be used by Jaysh al-Islam as double-agents. `Atiyya’s response, written sometime between 24 October 2006 and 22 November 2006, is cordial but distant, responding to the questions but refraining from giving any strategic advice.        

SOCOM-2012-0000009

This document is part of a longer letter which was not released to the CTC. It is not clear who authored the letter or to whom it was addressed. It discusses the potential need to change the name of “Qa`idat al-Jihad.” The author is of the view that the abridging of the name “al-Qa`ida” has “lessened Muslims’ feelings that we belong to them.” The author is further concerned that since the name “al-Qa`ida” lacks religious connotations, it has allowed the United States to launch a war on “al-Qa`ida” without offending Muslims. The author proposed a list of new names that capture Islamic theological themes: Ta’ifat al-tawhid wa-al-jihad (Monotheism and Jihad Group), Jama`at wahdat al-Muslimin (Muslim Unity Group), Hizb tawhid al-Umma al-Islamiyya (Islamic Nation Unification Party) and Jama`at tahrir al-aqsa (Al-Aqsa Liberation Group).             

SOCOM-2012-0000010

This letter is authored by “Abu `Abdallah” (Usama bin Ladin), addressed to “Shaykh Mahmud” (`Atiyya) and dated 26 April 2011 – a week before bin Ladin’s death. In it, Bin Ladin outlines his response to the “Arab Spring,” proposing two different strategies. The first strategy pertains to the Arab World and entails “inciting people who have not yet revolted and exhort[ing] them to rebel against the rulers (khuruj ‘ala al-hukkam)”; the second strategy concerns Afghanistan and it entails continuing to evoke the obligation of jihad there. The letter also makes reference to a wide variety of topics including: the scarcity of communications from Iraq, “the brothers coming from Iran,” and hostages held by “our brothers in the Islamic Maghreb” and in Somalia. The document also briefly discusses Bin Ladin’s sons, his courier, Shaykh Abu Muhammad (Ayman al-Zawahiri), and other individuals of interest.                      

SOCOM-2012-0000011

This letter, dated 28 March 2007, is addressed to a legal scholar by the name of Hafiz Sultan, and it is authored by someone who is of Egyptian origin. The author makes it explicit that he was alarmed by al-Qa`ida in Iraq’s conduct and he urges Sultan to write to that group’s leaders to correct their ways. The author also asks for legal guidance on the use of chlorine gas, which he appears not to support. A reference is also made to “the brothers in Lebanon” and the need to arrange “to have one of their representatives visit us in the near future.” A message from the “brothers in Algeria” is also included.

SOCOM-2012-0000012

This letter dated 11 June 2009 was written by `Atiyya to the “honorable shaykh.” It is possible that it was addressed to Usama bin Ladin, but it may have been addressed to another senior leader. The majority of the letter provides details on the release of detained jihadi “brothers” and their families from Iran and an indication that more are expected to be released, including Bin Ladin’s family. It seems that their release was partially in response to covert operations by al-Qa`ida against Iran and its interests.  

SOCOM-2012-0000013

This is a draft that formed the basis of a publicly available document, part four in a series of statements that Ayman al-Zawahiri released in response to the “Arab Spring.” Through the document one can observe al-Qa`ida’s editing process (reflected in the editor’s comments highlighted in green and in a bold font). While it is not clear if Bin Ladin himself did the editing, whoever did so has solid grammatical foundations and prefers a more self-effacing writing style than al-Zawahiri. The edits were not included in al-Zawahiri’s final speech which was released in a video on 4 March 2011 on jihadi forums. Of the 12 proposed corrections only one appears in al-Zawahiri’s speech.

SOCOM-2012-0000014

This document consists of two letters addressed to “Abu `Abd-al-Rahman,” almost certainly `Atiyya `Abd al-Rahman. It was sent by an operative who knows `Atiyya and is a religious student with ties to the senior shaykhs and clerics in Saudi Arabia. While the letters are not dated, their contents suggest they were composed soon after January 2007; they read very much like an intelligence assessment, designed to provide `Atiyya with some perspective on how al-Qa`ida generally, and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) more specifically, are perceived amongst Saudi scholars of varying degrees of prominence. The author provides `Atiyya with brief summaries of private meetings the author had with certain scholars, with the clear intent of evaluating the level of support that al-Qa`ida enjoys from some relatively prominent members of the Saudi religious establishment.

SOCOM-2012-0000015

This document is a letter dated 21 October 2010 from Bin Ladin to “Shaykh Mahmud” (`Atiyya). The letter is primarily focused on issues in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region. In the letter Bin Ladin specifically comments on: the security situation in Waziristan and the need to relocate al-Qa`ida members from the region; counter surveillance issues associated with the movement of his son Hamza within Pakistan; the appointment of `Atiyya’s three deputies; various al-Sahab videos and the media plan for the tenth anniversary of 9/11; the release of an Afghan prisoner held by al-Qa`ida; and the trial of Faisal Shahzad. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Yahya al-Libi, Saif al-`Adl, and Adam Gadahn are also mentioned in the document.         

SOCOM-2012-0000016

This document is a letter addressed to “Abu Basir” (Nasir al-Wuhayshi, leader of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula - AQAP) from an unidentified author, most likely Usama bin Ladin and/or `Atiyya. The letter is in part a response to specific requests for guidance from AQAP’s leadership. The author specifically advises AQAP to focus on targeting the United States, not the Yemeni government or security forces. The author also discusses media strategy and the importance of AQAP’s relations with Yemen’s tribes.           

SOCOM-2012-0000017

This document is a series of paragraphs, some of which match the content found in SOCOM-2012-0000016. This document was likely written by the author of that document. This letter discusses strategy, the need for al-Qa`ida to remain focused on targeting the United States (or even against U.S. targets in South Africa where other “brothers” are not active), the importance of tribal relations in a variety of different countries, and media activity.  

SOCOM-2012-0000018

This document is a letter addressed to Usama bin Ladin from “a loving brother whom you know and who knows you” and dated 14 September 2006. The author is critical of Bin Ladin for focusing al- Qa`ida’s operations on “Islamic countries in general and the Arabian Peninsula in particular.” He enumerates the numerous negative consequences of engaging in jihad inside Saudi Arabia, and informs Bin Ladin that people are now repulsed by the technical term “jihad” and even forbidden to use it in lectures. The author strongly advised Bin Ladin to change his policies.

SOCOM-2012-0000019

This document is a long letter authored by Usama bin Ladin after the death of Sheikh Sa‘id (Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid) in late May 2010 and it is addressed to “Shaykh Mahmud” (`Atiyya) who he designates as Sa‘id’s successor.  Bin Ladin’s letter is concerned with the mistakes committed by regional jihadi groups, which have resulted in the unnecessary deaths of thousands of Muslim civilians. Bin Ladin indicates that he would like to start a “new phase” so that the jihadis could regain the trust of Muslims. He directs `Atiyya to prepare a memorandum to centralize, in the hands of AQC, the media campaign and operations of regional jihadi groups. Considerable space is devoted to a discussion about Yemen, external operations and Bin Ladin’s plans for his son Hamza. This document includes an additional letter that Bin Ladin forwards to `Atiyya authored by Shaykh Yunis, presumably Yunis al-Mauritani, consisting of a new operational plan that al- Qa`ida should consider adopting.